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Maximising the benefits of Foreign Aid: 
leveraging in-country financing 
 
Alec Morton, Ashwin Arulselvan 
 
 
Abstract 
This Policy Brief outlines an alternative approach to maximising the benefit of donor aid 
in low income countries.  It has policy implications for the allocation of aid by Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and national governments. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In this Policy Brief we consider the responsibilities of donor agencies (e.g. the Global Fund, the 
African Development Bank, Oxfam, a rich country Department for International Development) 
to best disburse development aid.  We take the view that donor agencies have a moral 
responsibility to ensure that such funds are spent in an efficient way, which improves the lot of 
the intended beneficiaries to the greatest possible extent.  This is not a controversial view, 
indeed typically it is the espoused view of donors themselves. 
In this paper we discuss this issue from the point of view of allocative efficiency rather than 
technical efficiencyWKDWLVWKHTXHVWLRQRI³GRLQJWKHULJKWWKLQJV´UDWKHUWKDQRI³GRLQJWKLQJV
ULJKW´Of course we reaffirm that technical efficiency ± delivering programmes in a competent 
way ± is very important.)  We discuss what allocative efficiency means in the context where one 
is a donor seeking to finance, for example, health interventions in partnership with a country 
government which has its own indigenous domestic revenue stream. 
In particular, we argue that the traditional cost effectiveness principle of ordering based on cost 
effectiveness and proceeding down the list until the budget is exhausted is inappropriate in this 
context.  The intuition behind our critique is that by so doing, the donor takes the pressure off 
the domestic government to contribute its own resources to achieve the intended benefit.  In 
contrast, we propose two alternative decision rules which target funding at what are to the 
country government marginal projects, and demonstrate their superiority with respect to a 
worked example.  In a companion technical paper (in preparation) we present a mathematical 
analysis of this and related approaches. 
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2. Preventing HIV Infections ± a worked example 
We consider the following example.  The government of a low income country C has the 
opportunity to invest in a variety of HIV prevention activities, as shown in Table 1.  The total 
cost and number of infections averted from these activities are as shown (the data is roughly 
based on Hutton et al, 2003).  We can compute the cost of averting an HIV infection (observe 
that the activities are ordered in order of decreasing cost-effectiveness).  We suppose that 
country C makes its decisions on a cost effectiveness basis based on the opportunity cost of 
spending on other sectors.  In particular, country C considers that spending more than $300 of 
its domestic resources to avert a single HIV infection is not good value for money as it can 
achieve equivalent or more benefit (from its point of view) by investing $300 in some other 
sector.  This sector may have nothing to do with health; for example, it may be military spending 
which country C feels will enable it to seize resources of neighbouring countries. 
If country C follows standard cost effectiveness advice, it will implement activities 1 and 2 (in 
italics) on the list in Table 1.  It will spend $89,575 and will prevent 3,068 infections. 
 
Table 1.  Data for HIV prevention activities in country C 
 
 
Total Cost 
$ 
 
 
 
Number of 
infections 
averted 
 
 
Cost per HIV 
infection 
prevented 
(US$, 2002) 
 
1. Peer group education²sex workers 39,575 2473 16 
2. Safe blood transfusion 50,000 595 84 
3. Peer group education²young people 423,500 799 530 
4. Mass media and social marketing of 
condoms 1,300,000 2434 534 
5. Peer group education²high risk men 500,000 862 580 
6. Targeted AZT to pregnant women 300,000 319 939 
7. Voluntary testing 310,000 261 1190 
8. Targeted advice for breast feeding 150,000 62 2424 
9. Targeted treatment of STIs 560,000 204 2748 
 
 
 
Suppose there is a donor D which can supply $1m to country C to prevent HIV infections; how 
should it allocate its funding?  One option for D would be proceed down the list of HIV prevention 
activities and allocate funding to activities in cost effectiveness order until the money is 
exhausted.  In this case it would implement activities 1²3 completely and 35% of activity 4 
before its money runs out.  This means that there are no remaining opportunities which have a 
cost effectiveness better than £300 per infection averted and country C will spend no money on 
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HIV prevention.  Hence, under this scenario, $1,000,000 will be spent by donor D on HIV 
prevention and 4,779 infections will be averted. 
 
 
3. Maximising aid benefit; proposed donor decision rules 
 
Clearly, this £1m is being spent well in the sense that many HIV infections are being averted; 
but can more be achieved?  We observe that the financing from D is in this example taking the 
burden off (i.e. substituting for expenditure by) country C, which is now free to spend resources 
on other, possibly undesirable, activities.  In order to maximise aid donor benefit, we propose 
two decision rules for donor D. 
 
Our first decision rule is as follows: 
 
Rule 1.  D should fund only interventions which have a cost effectiveness which is worse than 
$300 per infection averted; 
 
In this case, country C will spend $89,575 (on activities 1 and 2) and will prevent 3,068 
infections, freeing up donor D to fund intervention 3 and 44% (rather than 35%) of activity 4, 
preventing 1,878 infections.  Thus, in total $1,089,575 will be spent by both C and D to prevent 
4,946 infections. 
 
Our second decision rule is: 
 
Rule 2.  D should fund only interventions which have a cost effectiveness worse than $300 per 
infection averted; and should fund such interventions only in part by subsidising them to bring 
the costs down to $300 per infection averted. 
 
The required subsidies are calculated in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: Data for selected HIV prevention activities in country, with donor D subsidies 
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3.Peer group 
education²
young people 
 
 
423,500 
 
799 
 
183,800 
 
239,700 
 
43% 
 
300 
 
230 
4. Mass media 
and social 
marketing of 
condoms 
 
1,300,00
0 
 
 
2434 
 
 
569,800 
 
 
730,200 
 
 
44% 
 
 
300 
 
 
234 
 
 
5. Peer group 
education²high 
risk men 
 
500,000 
 
 
862 
 
 
241,400 
 
 
258,600 
 
 
48% 
 
 
300 
 
 
280 
 
 
6. Targeted AZT 
to pregnant 
women 
 
300,000 
 
 
319 
 
 
204,300 
 
 
95,700 
 
 
68% 
 
 
300 
 
 
640 
 
 
7. Voluntary 
testing 
 
310,000 
 
261 
 
231,700 
 
78,300 
 
75% 
 
300 
 
888 
 
8. Targeted 
advice for breast 
feeding 
 
150,000 
 
 
62 
 
 
131,400 
 
 
18,600 
 
 
88% 
 
 
300 
 
 
2119 
 
 
9. Targeted 
treatment of STIs 
 
560,000 
 
204 
 
498,800 
 
61,200 
 
89% 
 
300 
 
2445 
 
 
 
In this example, once the cost effectiveness of an intervention is improved to the extent that it 
reaches $300 per infection averted, it now becomes cost effective for country C to invest in the 
activity. 
 
In this example, D will spend $995,000 (and thus have a small residual fund) to subsidise 
activities 3, 4 and 5.  Country C will spend £1,228,500 of its own resources on activities 3, 4 
and 5 (in italics), plus $89,575 on activities 1 and 2.  The total amount of investment by both D 
and C is therefore $2,313,075 and the total number of infections averted is 7,163.  The cost 
effectiveness of the investment for the donor D is shown in the rightmost column of the Table 2. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
It is clear from the above worked examples that (at least in our simple model) allocative rules 
IRUGRQRU'ZKLFKUHFRJQLVHFRXQWU\&¶VRZQGRPHVWLFSROLF\REMHFWLYHV ± which include the 
health of its population, but also other objectives which may be less legitimate ± are more 
HIIHFWLYH LQVHFXULQJFRQWULEXWLRQVIURPFRXQWU\&WRZDUGVGRQRU'¶VDLGREMHFWLYHV )RU WKH
data in this example, these rules lead to a more than doubling of expenditure (from $1,000,000 
to $2,313,075) and an almost doubling of benefits (from 4,779 to 7,163 infections averted) 
against the standard comparator model where the donor applies the standard cost effectiveness 
decision rule. 
 
This approach raises a number of issues.  First, there are clearly practical questions in the 
external assessment of the relative cost-effectiveness of policy interventions in country C and 
it should be recognised that this may depend on the scale of the investment required to meet a 
policy target in country C.  Second, this approach also raises policy questions for donor D and 
the extent to which it wishes ± explicitly or implicitly ± to influence the investment made by 
country C in its own domestic policy priorities ± in the policy field chosen by D, in the this case 
HIV infection.  These considerations will be dealt with more fully in the accompanying technical 
paper. 
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